




Skeleton of the Ideas





Objective, Realist, Physicalist Assumption

Whether something is accurately, phenomenally conscious is an objective, physical matter - it supervenes on the physical world and is not a construction projected onto the world by people.

Causal-Processualist Assumption

Centrally, being-accurately-conscious is a property of some [causal] processes, (states, creatures, programs, etc. are conscious only in a derivative sense.)



1st Argument for involvement of META-CAUSATION in CONSCIOUSNESS.

Reasonable additional assumption of Awareness of Own Processuality

The PRSA of a conscious process includes reacting to its own coherent processuality and not just to its own state trajectory.

Overview of the Argument:

- Processuality rests on causation
- So the process reacts to its own causation, directly or indirectly.
- This reaction is itself a causal matter.
- Thus, **direct** reaction to own causation is META-CAUSATION.
- The **indirect** option has major problems:
 - Presumably involves representing previous states and their causal links.
 - Difficult to make this naturalistic & objective.
 - Threatens to violate pre-reflectiveness
- META-CAUSATION → SIMPLER, MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD account.

2nd Argument for involvement of META-CAUSATION in CONSCIOUSNESS.

As a more natural alternative to above Awareness of Own Processuality, I propose:

Assumption of Awareness of Own PRSA

The PRSA of a conscious process includes awareness of that PRSA itself.

This is reasonable because the "self" in PRSA is the conscious process, and PRSA is essential to the process, so awareness of the self plausibly includes awareness of the PRSA

Overview of the Argument:

- The awareness of own PRSA is a matter of **causally** reacting to it, and the PRSA is itself crucially **causal**.
- So we have causal reaction to causation.
- So now we have just a special case of 1st Argument.
- But in an especially demanding form, as the process needs to "single out" the causation underlying self-awareness.


Danger of Infinite Regress:

- Have argued that PRSA is partially constituted of **meta**-causation.
- So awareness of own PRSA involves meta-meta-causation.
- So PRSA is partly constituted of **meta-meta**-causation.
- And so on up: meta-meta-meta-meta- ...

Avoidance of the Regress:


- At each level the process needn't have **full** awareness of its self-awareness.
- MORE SPECULATIVELY a regress could be prevented by circularity: meta-causation where 'meta' aspect is that it is reacting to **itself**.

3rd Argument for involvement of META-CAUSATION in CONSCIOUSNESS.




Supposition S (which leads to an Absurdum):

The causal self-reacting in PRSA is fully accounted for by causal reaction to own state trajectory with no direct reaction to the causal linking within the trajectory.



Now add a new "diagonal" process:



The diagonal process is just a moving version of the C1-to-C2 subprocess, and so just "confirms" D2

Argue that now, D2's record of D1 is equally well a record of C1, HENCE

Weird set of alternatives, such as:

- Q is no longer aware of itself from t_2 onwards, but rather of a larger conscious process that also includes P up to C1, even though from Q's point of view nothing has changed and there was no connection to P before t_2
- Q from t_2 onwards has two selves: Q, and a larger process that includes P up to C1.
- There is no objective fact as to what particular conscious process exists (contradicting Objectivist assumption above)



CAUTION on TERMINOLOGY:

Meta-causation in this work has also been called

- Iterated causation [refs D: Ehring]
- Higher order causation [refs D: Koons]

Meta-causation in this work is **NOT** other things that have been labelled as meta-causation, e.g.:

- Forms of top-down causation, or setting of parameters of causal models, or as in meta-causal powers [refs F: Ellis]



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For objections to the idea of pre-reflective self-awareness, see e.g.:

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